



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER
CARRIER STRIKE GROUP TEN
9756 DECATUR AVENUE SUITE 100
NORFOLK, VA 23511-3232

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830
Ser N00/ 165
4 Dec 17

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on CAPT (b) (3) (A) USN, ltr of 1 Dec 17

From: Commander, Carrier Strike Group TEN
To: Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

1. I have reviewed subject investigation and approve the investigating officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations. Subject investigation is returned for action.

(b) (3) (A)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CARRIER AIR WING THREE
1640 TOMCAT BLVD STE 200
VIRGINIA BEACH VIRGINIA 23460-4402

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

Ser N00/

4 Dec 17

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CAPT (b) (3) (A), USN, ltr of 1 Dec 17

From: Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE

To: Commander, Carrier Strike Group TEN

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

1. Forwarded, concurring with the investigating officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations.

(b) (3) (A)

30 NOV 2017

From: CAPT (b) (3) (A), USN
To: Commander, Carrier Strike Group TEN (CSG-10)
Via: Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE (CVW-3)
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

Ref: (a) Manual of the Judge Advocate General

Encl: (1) Convening Order of Command Investigation into Skydrawing by Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130) Aircrew
(2) Voluntary Statement Submitted by LT (b) (3) (A)
(3) Voluntary Statement Submitted by LT (b) (3) (A)
(4) VAQ-130 16 NOV 17 Original Flight Schedule
(5) Voluntary Statement Submitted by LCDR (b) (3) (A)
(6) Voluntary Statement Submitted by LT (b) (3) (A)
(7) VAQ-130 Element Briefing Guide
(8) Zapper 21 Cockpit Video Recording System (CVRS) Transcription
(9) VAQ-130 16 NOV 17 Completed Flight Schedule

(10) Photograph of Skydrawing Reported by the Navy Times
(11) Statement Concerning Zapper 21 Zapper 22 CVRS Functionality from LT (b) (3) (A)
(12) Voluntary Statement Submitted by CDR (b) (3) (A)
(13) Voluntary Statement Submitted by CDR (b) (3) (A)
(14) OPREP-3NUS, USMTF, 2017/VAQRON ONE THREE ZERO/002
(15) Summary of Interview with LT (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(16) Summary of Interview with LCDR (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(17) Summary of Interview with LCDR (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(18) Summary of Interview with LT (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(19) Summary of Interview with LTJG (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(20) Summary of Interview with CMDMC (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(21) Summary of Interview with AVCM (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(22) Summary of Interview with AZC (b) (3) (A) dtd 20 NOV 17
(23) Summary of Interview with ATAN (b) (3) (A) dtd 20

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

NOV 17

- (24) Summary of Interview with YN1 (b) (3) (A) dtd 20
NOV 17
- (25) VAQ-130 28 SEP 17 Flight Schedule
- (26) VAQ-130 03 OCT 17 Flight Schedule
- (27) VAQ-130 19 OCT 17 Flight Schedule
- (28) VAQ-130 17 NOV 17 Flight Schedule
- (29) Summary of Interview with VAQ-130 Work Centers dtd
20 NOV 17
- (30) Summary of Interview with LT (b) (3) (A) dtd 20
NOV 17
- (31) VAQ-130 2017 DEOMI Climate Survey Report Overall
Unit Summary
- (32) Voluntary Statement Submitted by LCDR (b) (3) (A)
- (33) Summary of Interview with CDR (b) (3) (A) dtd
20 NOV 17

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Pursuant to enclosure (1), and in accordance with reference (a), a command investigation has been conducted into the skydrawing created by VAQ-130 aircrew on 16 Nov 17. All reasonably available relevant evidence was collected. After being advised of their rights as suspects under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) submitted voluntary statements concerning their flight on 16 Nov 17 and answered all questions asked by the Investigating Officer. Enclosures (2) and (3) pertain.

2. Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Boards were concluded for LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) on 22 Nov 17.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Skydrawing Incident 16 November, 2017

- 1. LCDR (b) (3) (A), LT (b) (3) (A), LT (b) (3) and LT (b) (3) (A) were scheduled to execute a two aircraft Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) event on 16 Nov 17 1215-1345(L). [Encls (2), (3), (4), (5), (6)]
- 2. LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) were scheduled to be Zapper 21. [Encl (4)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

3. LCDR (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) were scheduled to be Zapper 22. [Encl (4)]

4. LT (b) (3) (A) was scheduled to be the section lead and brief the event. [Encl (4)]

5. The event was scheduled to brief at 1045, launch at 1215 and land at 1345(L). [Encl (4)]

6. After seeing the flight schedule, LCDR (b) (3) (A) informed LT (b) (3) (A) that he intended to land by 1330 in order to attend Planning Board for Training (PB4T) and Department Head (DH) meetings that started at 1400(L). [Encls (2), (4), (5)]

7. LCDR (b) (3) (A) preferred that the flight focus on basic air work and mechanics to minimize the need for a lengthy tactical debrief. [Encl (5)]

8. LCDR (b) (3) (A) led the flight brief and characterizes it as a thorough but an expedited NATOPS brief that covered everything that he considered relevant to expected conduct of flight referencing the CVWP in-flight guide. [Encl (2), (3), (5), (7)]

9. At no point during the brief or pre-flight phase was there discussion of utilizing contrails to create any shapes. [Encl (2), (15)]

10. Quiet hours were scheduled at NAS Whidbey Island 1100-1200(L) on 16 Nov 17. [Encls (2), (4), (5)]

11. All on-deck procedures, departure, climb-out, transit to the Okanagan MOA, and section G-warm once established in the airspace were normal and uneventful. [Encls (2), (3), (5), (6)]

12. The section separated. Zapper 21 took the western section of the working area and Zapper 22 took the center and eastern section. [Encls (2), (3), (5), (6)]

13. After completing Zapper 21 transponder troubleshooting, Zapper 22 aircrew worked on air-to-air radar mechanics and basic air work. [Encls (5), (6)]

14. After completing transponder troubleshooting, Zapper 21 performed maneuvers and Hands On Throttle and Stick(HOTAS) mechanics. [Encl (3)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

15. Zapper 21 aircrew noticed that the aircraft was producing contrails. [Encls (2), (3)]

16. LT (b)(3) recommended that the aircrew fly the aircraft to create a phallic-shape object with the contrails. [Encls (2), (3), (8)]

17. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) decided to draw a phallic-shaped object with contrails and executed the drawing. [Encls (2), (3), (8)]

18. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) did not expect the contrails to last for a significant period of time nor did they expect the drawing to be distinguishable by anyone outside of their aircraft. [Encl (3)]

19. Zapper 21 aircrew took photographs of the contrail drawing in flight. [Encls (2), (3)]

20. LCDR (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3)(A) noticed the contrail drawing from Zapper 21 and LCDR (b)(3)(A) said, "Your artwork is amazing," to Zapper 21 on the section's tactical frequency. [Encls (2), (5), (6), (8)]

21. The Cockpit Video Recording System (CVRS) from Zapper 22 did not record any video or audio data from the 16 NOV 17 flight. [Encl (11)]

22. The Zapper 22 aircrew reported seeing an RMMFL advisory (Removable Memory Module Full). [Encl (11)]

23. After seeing the drawing remain longer than expected, LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) concluded that they had made a mistake and unsuccessfully attempted to obfuscate the drawing by flying through it multiple times. [Encls (2), (3), (10)]

24. Zappers 21 and 22 returned to NAS Whidbey Island separately without any further incidence. [Encls (2), (3), (5), (6)]

25. Zapper 21 logged 1.8 flight hours. [Encl (9)]

26. Zapper 22 logged 1.6 flight hours. [Encl (9)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

27. LCDR (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) conducted a standard crew debrief at the completion of their flight prior to LCDR (b) (3) (A) attending the PB4T and DH meetings. [Encls (5), (6)]

28. LCDR (b) (3) (A) told LT (b) (3) (A) that he wanted to meet with him, LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) after his meetings. [Encl (5)]

29. LCDR (b) (3) (A) intended to speak to LT (b) (3) (A) LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) about using flight time constructively not drawing obscene images. [Encls (3), (5)]

30. LT (b) (3) (A), LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) met after the flight to debrief section Admin and TAC Admin. [Encls (2), (3), (6)]

31. The contrail drawing was mentioned in the debrief. [Encl (6)]

32. At approximately 1545, the VAQ-130 Squadron Duty Officer (SDO) received a call from CAPT (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Wing Pacific Deputy Commodore, asking to speak with the VAQ-130 Commanding Officer (CO) or Executive Officer (XO). [Encl (12)]

33. CDR (b) (3) (A), VAQ-130 XO, spoke with CAPT (b) (3) (A) and confirmed that VAQ-130 had aircraft operating in the Okanagan MOA at approximately 1245(L) on that day. [Encl (12)]

34. CAPT (b) (3) (A) told CDR (b) (3) (A) to secure all tapes from relevant flights and to check his email for details regarding an incident. [Encl (12)]

35. CAPT (b) (3) (A) emailed pictures of the phallic-shaped object that were taken from the ground to CDR (b) (3) (A). [Encl (12)]

36. CDR (b) (3) (A) asked LT (b) (3) (A) if anything happened in the Okanagan MOA that would generate a call from the Deputy Commodore. [Encl (12)]

37. LT (b) (3) (A) couldn't think of anything and seemed confused by the inquiry. [Encl (12)]

38. CDR (b) (3) (A) asked LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) if anything happened in the Okanagan MOA during their flight. [Encls (2), (3), (12)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

39. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) immediately requested to speak with CDR (b)(3) in his office and told him the entire sequence of events regarding the drawing of a phallic-shaped object with their aircraft contrails. [Encls (2), (3), (12)]

40. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) deleted photographs of the phallic-shaped object from their phones after admitting responsibility for the skydrawing to the VAQ-130 XO. [Encls (2), (3)]

41. LT (b)(3) stated that he deleted the skydrawing photographs from his phone out of shame and as an attempt at damage control to prevent further accidental spread of the photographs. [Encl (3)]

42. LT (b)(3) stated the deletion of the skydrawing photographs was not an attempt to cover up anything. [Encl (3)]

43. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) apologized and immediately expressed remorse. [Encl (12)]

44. The VAQ-130 CO and XO did not question LT (b)(3)(A)'s judgement and professionalism prior to the 16 Nov 17 incident. [Encls (12), (13)]

45. The VAQ-130 CO and XO did not question LT (b)(3)'s judgement and professionalism prior to the 16 Nov 17 incident. [Encls (12), (13)]

46. VAQ-130 released an OPREP-3 message at 1624(L) 16 Nov 17 addressing the skydrawing incident because media attention was expected. [Encl (14)]

SQUADRON COMMAND CLIMATE

47. CDR (b)(3)(A) stated he does not believe the squadron has a culture that accepts or condones sexual harassment or tolerance. [Encl (12)]

48. LT (b)(3) stated VAQ-130 is the envy of the flightline. [Encl (15)]

49. LCDR (b)(3)(A) stated the Ready Room culture is great, much better than his experience as a Junior Officer. [Encl (16)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

50. LCDR (b) (3) (A) stated the VAQ-130 Junior Officers have diverse personalities, but are inclusive. [Encl (17)]

51. LT (b) (3) (A) stated the VAQ-130 Ready Room is better than it was when he was a Junior Officer in the squadron, 2012-2014. [Encl (18)]

52. LTJG (b) (3) (A) stated there are a few disgruntle people, but almost everyone loves it here. [Encl (19)]

53. LTJG (b) (3) (A) stated the skydrawing incident does not accurately reflect on the Command. [Encl (19)]

54. CMDCM (b) (3) (A) stated he does not believe the Command discriminates against any individual or group. [Encl (20)]

55. CDMCM (b) (3) (A) stated the squadron had addressed a situation in which a female sailor witnessed males having an inappropriate conversation in a work center. [Encl (20)]

56. CMDCM (b) (3) (A) stated the Chiefs' Mess gets along well. [Encl (20)]

57. AVCM (b) (3) (A) stated the Goat Locker is great and sees no worrying concerns or trends. [Encl (21)]

58. AZC (b) (3) (A) stated the Command is really good and females are treated fairly. [Encl (22)]

59. AZC (b) (3) (A) stated squadron decisions are based on competency and work ethic rather than sex or race. [Encl (22)]

60. ATAN (b) (3) (A) stated she thinks females are treated well in the Command and she feels comfortable approaching senior personnel with a problem. [Encl (23)]

61. YN1 (b) (3) (A) stated all sailors are treated fairly regardless of sex or ethnicity. [Encl (24)]

62. LCDR (b) (3) (A) stated a suggestion for a female E-5 to be removed from a detachment in order to save money on birthing was rejected by Command leadership due to its contradiction to the Command's priority of equal opportunity over fiscal constraints. [Encl (17)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

63. CDR (b) (3) (A) has daily "Coffee with Skipper" meetings with enlisted personnel as a way to stay in tune with the Command climate. [Encls (25), (26), (27), (28)]

64. CAPT (b) (3) (A) received overwhelmingly positive feedback when discussing the Command's climate with approximately 24 E-3 to E-6 personnel. [Encl (29)]

65. LT (b) (3) stated the Ready Room is a tight knit group of officers that get along well. [Encl (30)]

66. VAQ-130's latest command climate survey (2017) places the squadron above or within average Navy ranges for all measurable areas; except for hazing where it is below (positive attribute) Navy averages. [Encl (31)]

67. CDR (b) (3) (A) stated CDR (b) (3) (A) is overwhelmingly liked by squadron personnel. [Encl (12)]

68. LCDR (b) (3) (A) stated the CO and XO are approachable and respected. [Encl (16)]

69. LT (b) (3) stated the VAQ-130 Front Office is known to be great. [Encl (15)]

Flight Hour Execution

70. LCDR (b) (3) VAQ-130 Operations Officer, attempts to utilize all flight hours allocated to the squadron for aircrew currency, squadron readiness and tactical qualification progression; but he felt no pressure to schedule flight solely to execute flight hours. [Encl (32)]

71. CDR (b) (3) (A) stated that VAQ-130 had planned to get ahead on FY-18 QTR1 flight hour execution due to limited flight opportunities while the squadron supported the Growler Tactics Instructors Course. [Encl (33)]

72. When asked about flying without specific training to accomplish, LCDR (b) (3) (A) said, "We don't just burn holes in the sky." [Encl (16)]

OPINIONS

SKYDRAWING INCIDENT 16 NOVEMBER, 2017

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

1. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) utilized the unique atmospheric conditions to draw a large phallic-shaped object within the Okanogan MOA (Military Operating Area) (FOF (17), (19), (20), (23), (31), (39), (43)).
2. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) did not pre-plan the sky writing at any point prior to the event. (FOF (9)).
3. The decision to execute the sky writing was only made by the aircrew at the completion of the training outlined in the mission flight brief (FOF (7), (14)).
4. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) deleted the photos they had taken of the sky writing out of panic and a desire to minimize any possibility of inadvertent release to social media (FOF (40), (41), (42)).
5. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) did not delete the photos in an attempt to cover up the incident or mislead the investigation. They did so after the incident had already been reported to Commander, Electronic Attack Wing, Pacific (CVWP) and VAQ-130, and after admitting to VAQ-130 XO that they had conducted the skydrawing (FOF (40), (41), (42)).
6. LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) understood their actions reflected a complete lack of professionalism and the impact of them (FOF (43)).
7. Both LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) were remorseful of their actions and the negative impact caused by them (FOF (43)).
8. Neither LT (b)(3)(A) nor LT (b)(3) has a previous record of inappropriate behavior, either as Naval Aviators or as Naval Officers (FOF (44), (45)).
9. LT (b)(3)(A) and LCDR (b)(3)(A) witnessed the sky writing and commented on it via radio; but, neither voiced concern that the object could potentially be visible from the ground (FOF (20)).
10. The sky writing was witnessed by members of the public and reported to CVWP, who in turn notified the squadron (FOF (35)).

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UNDERLYING ISSUES THAT FACILITAED THE SKYDRAWING INCIDENT ON 17
NOVEMBER 2017

11. Although not originally annotated as the assigned briefer for the event, LCDR (b)(3)(A) assumed the role of mission commander and briefer for the event. Subsequently, LCDR (b)(3)(A) prioritized attending two scheduled meetings above mission planning for the flight and directed the other members of the flight to plan the mission at a level that did not require a thorough debrief of the event (FOF (6), (7), (8)).

12. LCDR (b)(3)(A)'s expeditious flight brief for the event did not provide adequate guidance on secondary and tertiary training missions (FOF (7), (8)).

13. The VAQ-130 standard mission briefing guide mentions alternate missions, though it does not specifically address or list them (FOF (8)).

14. Zapper 21 and Zapper 22 desired to execute the flight hours as listed on the flight in support of the Operations Department goal of expending their quarterly flight hour grant (FOF (25), (26), (70), (71)).

15. CVW-3 flight hour grant execution guidance was understood by VAQ-130 Operations Officer (FOF (70)).

16. Both VAQ-130 CO and OPSO had a desire to maximize the execution of the squadron's quarterly flight hour grant in order to provide meaningful training for squadron aircrew (FOF (70), (71)).

17. The flight hours executed by Zapper 21 and Zapper 22 exceeded the planned flight hours on the flight schedule (FOF (5), (25), (26)).

18. The flight hours executed by Zapper 21 and Zapper 22 exceeded the time required to execute the training outlined in the flight brief, opening the opportunity to conduct the skydrawing (FOF (14)).

SQUADRON COMMAND CLIMATE

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

19. VAQ-130's overall command climate is healthy (FOF (47-69)).
20. VAQ-130's 2017 command climate survey did not indicate sexism or sexual harassment as an area of concern (FOF (66)).
21. There are no apparent underlying tones of sexism or misogyny evident in the ward room (FOF (49-52), (65)).
22. There are no apparent underlying tones of sexism or misogyny evident in the Chief's Mess (FOF (56), (57), (58)).
23. There are no apparent underlying tones of sexism or misogyny evident in the work centers (FOF (52), (54), (59-61)).
24. VAQ-130 recognizes the contributions of Sailors regardless of where they work in the command (FOF (59), (61)).
25. VAQ-130 leadership has swiftly responded to a reported instance of inappropriate behavior within the command (FOF (55), (62)).
26. VAQ-130's unit cohesion, morale and esprit de corps is strong (FOF (48-50), (51), (52), (64), (67), (69)).
27. VAQ-130 Officers and Sailors hold the Commanding Officer in high regard. There was no mention of his call sign made in any interview or discussion (FOF (63), (64), (68), (69)).

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I recommend Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE issue Non-punitive Letters of Instruction to LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) in order to account for their actions and provide a measured method for them to regain the trust and confidence placed in them as both Naval Officers and Naval Aviators. While the sky writing conducted by LT (b)(3)(A) and LT (b)(3) was crude, immature, and unprofessional it was not pre-meditated or planned and not in keeping with their character demonstrated prior to the incident. Even so, it has caused the United States Navy severe embarrassment in the public arena and jeopardizes the strategic narrative that underpins the justification of the flight hour program. Additionally, the absence of relevant, effective,

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

professional training highlighted by the sophomoric skydrawing indicates a potential waste and misuse of government resources.

2. I recommend Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE issue a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution to LCDR (b) (3) (A) addressing his leadership failure and responsibility for enabling the incident. The skydrawing incident was facilitated first and foremost by the pre-mission planning guidance and subsequent expeditious flight briefing by LCDR (b) (3) (A)

3. I recommend Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE issue LT (b) (3) (A) a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution. Despite his limited time on board VAQ-130, it reinforces Naval Aviation's crew concept and our strong culture of "no rank in the cockpit" and our holding one another accountable to high standards of professionalism.

4. I recommend Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE issue CDR (b) (3) (A) a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution outlining actions to be accomplished to ensure this remains an isolated incident. Ultimately, as the Commanding Officer, he is accountable for the actions taken by his aircrew. It is imperative that the underlying issues which facilitated this incident be addressed.

5. I recommend that Deputy Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE issue CDR (b) (3) (A) a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution outlining the professional role expected of him throughout the remainder of his Executive and Commanding Officer tour.

6. I recommend Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE directs VAQ-130 CO to conduct a review of alternate training referenced in the briefing guide to ensure that adequate, effective, and relevant training is briefed and conducted on all squadron flight events.

7. I recommend Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE directs VAQ-130 to conduct a call-sign review board of squadron Officers to ensure that they are in keeping with both good taste and previously published direction from Naval Aviation leadership.

8. Since the investigation revealed no indications of poor command climate and no evidence or allegations overt sexism or misogyny, that those matter should be considered closed and VAQ-

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130 should proceed with any outstanding plans or roadmaps to continue to address any areas of concern highlighted by surveys or focus groups.

(b) (3) (A)





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
CARRIER AIR WING THREE
1640 TOMCAT BLVD STE 200
VIRGINIA BEACH VIRGINIA 23460-4402

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

Ser N00/110

17 Nov 17

From: Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE (CVW-3)
To: CAPT (b) (3) (A) USN

Ref: (a) Manual of the Judge Advocate General

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO SKYDRAWING BY VAQ-130 AIRCREW

1. This appoints you, per chapter II of reference (a), to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding VAQ-130 aircrew maneuvering in the contrail layer to draw a phallic symbol on or about 16 Nov 17.

2. Investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of potential misconduct on the part of VAQ-130 aircrew in Zapper 21 and Zapper 22 on or about 16 Nov 17. Expand the scope of your investigation as necessary to include investigating any collateral misconduct that comes to your attention. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations to Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE in letter form no later than 1 Dec 17, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, read chapter II of reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation.

3. Prior to and during the course of your investigation, you may seek technical, logistical, and administrative support from Commander, Carrier Air Wing THREE staff as required, and legal advice from LCDR (b) (3) (A) Staff Judge Advocate, Carrier Strike Group TEN.

(b) (3) (A)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
VAQ-130 SQUADRON SPACES

2. DATE
20 Nov 2017

I, (b) (3) (A), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (3) (A),
whom I know to be THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER.

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

ON 16 NOV 17, I WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAD A SECTION OF EA-18Gs TO THE OKANOGAN MOA TO CONDUCT UNIT LEVEL TRAINING. DUE TO A SCHEDULED HOT SWITCH THAT NEEDED TO LAND PRIOR TO 1100 DUE TO QUIET HOURS AND LCDR (b) (3) S NEEDED TO BE AT A PB4T FOLLOWING OUR FLIGHT, LCDR (b) (3) BRIEFED ADMIN AND TAC ADMIN. THE BRIEF WAS QUICK BUT THOROUGH. I DISCUSSED SOME SPECIFIC A/A MECHANICS THAT I HAD PLANNED TO REFRESH MYSELF ON DURING THE FLIGHT AND OFFERED TO MY WINGMAN AS SOMETHING NEW TO LEARN. AT NO POINT DURING THE BRIEF OR PRE-FLIGHT PHASE WAS THERE DISCUSSION OF UTILIZING CONTRAILS OR ANY FORM OF AIRCRAFT MARKING TO CREATE ANY SHAPES.

DURING OUR READING OF THE BOOK IN MAINTENANCE, WE WERE ASKED TO DO SOME TROUBLESHOOTING OF THE IFF SYSTEM IN OUR JET SO WE ADDED TO OUR CONDUCT A TEST OF THAT SYSTEM. WALK, PREFLIGHT, START, TAXI, AND TAKEOFF WERE ALL UNREMARKABLE. UPON CHECKING INTO THE AIRSPACE, WE CONDUCTED A BRIEFED G-WARM, CALLED FENCED IN, AND I CLEARED MY WINGMAN TO DETACH TO THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN THIRDS OF THE MOA. I ORBITED MY AIRCRAFT IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE WESTERN THIRD OF THE AIRSPACE WHILE WAITING FOR DASH TWO TO TRANSIT FAR ENOUGH OUT TO CHECK OUR IFF. ONCE THAT WAS COMPLETE, WE BEGAN CONDUCT AS SINGLES WITH NO PLAN TO REJOIN. AFTER TRANSITING NORTH THEN SOUTH, WE NOTED CONTRAILS FORMING BETWEEN ~23K' AND 25K'. THE EWO SUGGESTED WE DRAW A PENIS WITH OUR CONTRAILS. MY INITIAL INTERNAL REACTION WAS NO - BAD IDEA BUT FOR SOME REASON STILL UNKNOWN TO ME, I EVENTUALLY DECIDED TO DO IT. WE TALKED ABOUT THE MECHANICS, EXECUTED IT, AND THEN OBSERVED IT. DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN WHICH WERE LATER DELETED ONCE WE KNEW OUR ACTIONS WERE PUBLIC. AT SOME POINT, THE EXACT TIME OF WHICH IS UNKNOWN TO ME, OUR DASH TWO REMARKED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF NICE ARTWORK. THAT ADDED TO MY BUILDING REMORSE SINCE I KNEW THIS WAS VISIBLE BEYOND JUST MY AIRCRAFT. SOON AFTER I REALIZED THE EXTENT OF OUR ACTIONS, THAT THE CONTRAILS WERE REMAINING LONGER THAN PREDICTED, AND THAT THE TOWN OF OMAK, WINTHROP, AND TWISP WERE POTENTIALLY WITHIN VIEW OF OUR CONTRAILS, I REMARKED THAT WE NEEDED TO TAKE STEPS TO TRY TO OBFUSCATE IT. I FLEW ONE PASS OVER IT ESSENTIALLY TRYING TO SCRIBBLE IT OUT WITH MY CONTRAILS. THAT PASS WAS INEFFECTIVE, SO I MADE ANOTHER PASS UNTIL WE REACHED OUR RTB FUEL STATE AND THE END OF OUR AIRSPACE. WE RETURNED TO BASE UNEVENTFULLY AND SHUT DOWN THEN DEBRIEFED MAINTENANCE. I, LT (b) AND LTJG (b) (3) (A) DEBRIEFED THE ADMIN PHASE OF FLIGHT WITH LIMITED COMMENTS DUE TO THE EXTENDED OPERATION AS SINGLES. NO COMMENT WAS MADE TO MY MEMORY OF THE CONTRAILS.

ROUGHLY HALF AN HOUR LATER, THE VAQ-130 XO CAME IN TO MY OFFICE, ASKED WHAT HAPPENED IN THE OKANOGAN AND WHY WE WERE BEING ASKED TO SECURE TAPES. I IMMEDIATELY KNEW IT WAS BECAUSE OF MY ACTIONS, ASKED XO TO SPEAK IN HIS OFFICE, AND TOLD HIM THE COMPLETE STORY OF WHAT WE HAD DONE.

(b) (3) (A)

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT**

1. PLACE

NAS Whidbey Island

2. DATE

20 Nov 2017

I, LT (b) (3) (A), make the following

free and voluntary statement to CAPT (b) (3) (A),

whom I know to be the Investigating Officer.

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

The flight in question took place on 16 November 2017. The aircrew involved found ourselves on a somewhat expedited timeline due to a hot pit/hot switch evolution that coincided with the final flight in the Zappers for LCDR (b) (3). Due to this, LCDR (b) (3) decided as the senior aircrew in the flight that he would brief to ensure that all required information was covered. Admin, Tac Admin, and ORM were all briefed in accordance with NATOPS, and it was briefed that Admin and Tac Admin would be conducted as a section. Once the aircraft were established in the area, we would conduct a G-Warm and then split into singles for the remainder of the flight. The lead aircraft would take the westernmost portion of the Okanagan, and Dash-2 would take the central and eastern portions, FL280 and below. The conduct was briefed so that Dash-2 would interrogate the lead aircraft's IFF systems as requested by maintenance, after which each aircraft would conduct their own individual training to work on any specific training area they saw fit. The reason for the simplified conduct was due to the known fact that LCDR (b) (3) had a meeting immediately after our land time and would not be able to make an in depth debrief that required all four aircrew.

After the interrogation phase of the flight was completed, a little more than halfway through the flight, the lead aircraft began to perform maneuvers and HOTAS mechanics in the western Okanagan area. As we climbed up to about 23,000 feet we noticed that contrails were forming behind our jet. We continued to maneuver, and noticed that it was marking our flight path. We noted that the event was interesting, and eventually we discussed the idea of drawing something. Ultimately I came up with the idea of the object in question and began to maneuver the aircraft to generate the shape. As we were doing so, we were joking back and forth thinking it was funny, not thinking that the contrails would last, or that they may have been significantly visible to anybody outside of our aircraft.

Eventually, we noticed that the contrails were not dissipating, and came to the conclusion that we may have made a mistake, and maneuvered to generate additional contrails in an attempt to distort, and possibly erase the previously drawn shape without success. After several attempts, we were at the end of our range time, and decided to RTB as a single, about 10-15 minutes after Dash-2. The RTB was uneventful; however, after we got out of the jet and spoke to the Plane Captain, he asked us how our flight was and what we did. We both realized we did not have a good answer and began to doubt our decision, still however, not thinking our actions would have drawn the attention that they did.

Post flight we held a debrief between LT (b) (3), LTJG (b) (3) and myself. We covered Admin and Tac Admin, not discussing the contrail shapes since at the time they did not seem significant. After LCDR (b) (3)'s meeting, he joined LT (b) (3) in their office to wrap up any loose ends from our debrief. It was at this time that the XO came into the hallway asking what had happened in the Okanagan. LT (b) (3) and I realized it had to be related to our actions, and we requested to speak to XO immediately in his office. We explained the full truth of what we did, setting the events in motion that led to today. I did have photos on my phone and in a kneejerk reaction, deleted them. This was mostly out of shame, and also an attempt at damage control to prevent any further accidental spread of photos and not an attempt to cover anything up, as we knew the damage was already done.

(b) (3) (A)



(b) (3) (A)

Commanding Officer

Day: Thursday, 16 Nov 2017
JD / TZ: 7320 / -8
Sorties / Hours: 5 / 7.5
Flown/Grant(%): 267.4 / 392.0 (68.2%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 27.9 / 29.9

VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)

Executive Officer

Sunrise: 0720
Sunset: 1630
Moonrise: 0512
Moonset: 1611
Illumination: 5 %

SDO

(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF

(b) (3) (A)

SCHEDULE WRITER

(b) (3)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S FAIROPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	ZAPPR 11	50_	0745 / 0945 / 1115	KNUW	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	SEAD	3	OKAN/MOLS	TAC-1	/ /
86316	OKNA	50_		KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A9	20.3	1000-1100	1, 2, 3	/ /
1	ZAPPR 13	50_	0745 / 0945 / 1115	KNUW	(b) (3)	(b) (3) (A)	SEAD	3	OKAN/MOLS	TAC-1	/ /
86316	OKNA			KNUW			1A9	20.3	1000-1100	2, 3	/ /
HP / HS 2 A/C FROM EVT 1 INTO EVT 2											
2	ZAPPR 21	50_	1045 / 1215 / 1345	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3)	SEAD	3	OKAN/MOLS	TAC-1	/ /
86350	OKNA	50_		KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3)	1A9	20.3	1230-1330	2	/ /
* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR											
SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): / / SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): / / FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): / /											

FLIGHT/SIMULATOR NOTES:

1. GWTP 3.8F FOR (b) (3)
2. QUIET HOURS 1100-1200L - STRAIGHT-IN, FULL STOP LANDINGS ONLY. AVOID HANGAR 5 TO MAX EXTENT PRACTICAL.
3. ZAPPR 11 AND ZAPPR 13 MARSA

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
2. 1300 - 1330	OPS / MX MEETING	OPS	(b) (3) (h) AVCM (b) (3)
3. 1330 - 1400	DET MEETING	READY ROOM	(b) (3) (A) (h) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) ADC (b) (3) ADC (b) (3)
4. 1400 - 1500	PB4T	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) CDR (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (b) (3)
5. 1500 - 1545	DH MEETING	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) CDR (b) (3) CMDM (b) (3) ALL DEPT HEADS
6. 1500 - 1600	FEP PT	BASE GYM	ALL REQUIRED
7. 1830 - 2030	FAREWELL	DEBRIEF LOCATION 4	ALL INTERESTED

QUESTIONS:

NATOPS: TRUE/FALSE: SWITCHING VALVE OPERATION IS COMPLETELY HYDRO-MECHANICAL, SEPARATE FROM ELECTRICAL INPUTS OR RESET COMMANDS. AS MECHANIZED, THERE IS NO HAZARD ASSOCIATED WITH MULTIPLE RESET ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN AN X'ED SURFACE FOLLOWING A HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT FAILURE.

SOP: WHAT CRITERIA MUST BE MET TO PERFORM A PRACTICE SECTION LANDING?

TACTICS: DEFINE CAT IV AIRCRAFT?

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

(b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3)

Submitted By:

(b) (3) (A)

Reviewed By:

(b) (3) (A)

Approved By:

(b) (3) (A)

Schedule Writer

Assistant Operations Officer

Commanding Officer

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE

NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA

2. DATE

20 Nov 2017

I, LCDR (b) (3) (A), USN, make the following

free and voluntary statement to CAPT (b) (3) (A), USN,

whom I know to be conducting a command investigation into a flight that occurred on 16 November 2017.

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

I was the senior member in a flight of two EA-18G aircraft from VAQ-130 that conducted a local training sortie on 16 November 2017. When the flight schedule was released on the night prior to the event, I spoke with LT (b) (3) who was on to brief the flight and who had been designated the section lead pilot. I informed him of my intention to be on deck NLT 1330 so that I could make it to a PB4T and DH Meeting that started at 1400. I told him that I'd prefer the flight conduct to focus on basic air work and mechanics so as to minimize the need for a lengthy and involved tactical debrief since I expected the meetings that afternoon to last for several hours.

Quiet hours were scheduled at the field for the day of the event from 1100-1200 for a change of command ceremony. We were therefore expecting the event preceding our own to land 15-20 minutes earlier than originally scheduled, which shortened the normal period between our scheduled brief time and the time we expected we would need to execute the hot-pit/hot-switch evolution. I took a look at the mission planning that LT (b) (3), LT (b) (3), and LT (b) (3) had done in preparation for the event; I made note of a weather that included relatively low ceilings and significant icing layers, and decided that I would brief the event personally as the senior member of the flight. I would characterize the brief as a thorough but expedited NATOPS brief that covered everything that I considered relevant to the expected conduct of flight. I referenced the briefing guide from the CVWP in-flight guide and we had a detailed discussion of the weather, including a reading of the INLET ICE caution emergency procedure, section departure and rendezvous procedures, and standard TAC Admin.

All on-deck procedures, the departure and climb-out, transit to the Okanagan MOA, and section G-warm once established in the airspace were normal and uneventful. Once our flight separated, we split the airspace in two sections. My aircraft would remain in the central and eastern portions of the airspace. LT (b) (3) and LT (b) (3) would remain in the western section of the airspace. LT (b) (3) and I conducted some troubleshooting as requested by the AT shop. This troubleshooting required some coordination with the other aircraft, and we accomplished the troubleshooting within approximately five minutes. Thereafter, LT (b) (3) and I proceeded to work on some A/A radar mech and basic air work, including a descent to approx. 2,500 feet MSL. We had an extensive discussion about the fuel we would need when we started our RTB to NASWI and our desired timeline. We noted some bonfires that appeared to have been deliberately set and we orbited around that area for some time. At approximately 1245L, LT (b) (3) and I noted contrails in the sky to the west that were in a recognizable shape. From our distance and perspective, the shape appeared smaller and more distorted than was apparent in the pictures I would later see posted by the public on social media. We had a brief conversation about the contrails, I made a curt radio call to the other aircraft on our section's tactical frequency, and I do not recall receiving a response from LT (b) (3) or LT (b) (3). Shortly thereafter, LT (b) (3) and I departed the airspace and returned to NASWI as a single. All other aspects of the flight were uneventful.

LT (b) (3) and I completed a standard crew debrief. I told LT (b) (3) that I needed to attend the PB4T and DH meeting and that I didn't have anything of note to debrief for the section admin and tac admin phases of the flight. I told him that I'd like to meet with everyone after my meetings to discuss a few things. At no point did I appreciate that the contrails we saw in the area were likely to attract public attention. The contrail formation appeared to me to be small enough and distorted enough that I did not expect a casual observer to notice it. In my experience, contrails also tend to dissipate quickly and I expected the same thing to happen in this case.

I intended to speak with LT (b) (3), LT (b) (3), and LT (b) (3) after my meetings about the importance of using our flight time to train and make the most of it. Drawing anything in the sky - especially obscene images - is not such an effective use of our flight time. After my meeting, we were in the process of getting the two crews together when XO informed us that he had received an image of the contrails from the Deputy Commander at CVWP. (b) (3) (A)

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT**

1. PLACE

VAQ-130 Squadron Spaces

2. DATE

20 Nov 2017

I, LT (b) (3) (A), make the following
free and voluntary statement to CAPT (b) (3) (A),
whom I know to be the Investigating Officer.

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

I was the dash-2 pilot for the event. The brief and departure were standard. Upon entering the airspace we executed a g-warm and then split up as singles. My aircraft took the central and eastern portion of the airspace, the lead aircraft took the western portion. After detaching we interrogated the lead aircraft's IFF to help maintenance with a gripe. After confirming that the IFF was working properly we transited north and south in the area executing air-to-ground radar mechanics and some aerobatics. I noticed contrails to the west and mentioned them to my EWO. We continued flying around and then I noticed the contrails were in the shape of a penis which I brought to the attention of my EWO. My EWO mentioned the artwork over our tactical frequency which the lead aircraft acknowledged. We stayed in the area for approximately 15 more minutes and then started our transit back to Whidbey as a single. I debriefed with my EWO since he had to get to a meeting and then I debriefed with the aircrew in the lead jet. The artwork was mentioned in the debrief but we kept the debrief relatively short since there was not much to discuss from the flight.

(b) (3) (A)

UNCLASSIFIED

EA-18G Element Brief (~45 min)

Admin

Time Hack (Comm: 202-762-1401 / DSN: 762-1401)
Mission Overview / Event / Julian Date
ORM (Mission / Aircrew)
Product Review / Pen & Ink Changes
ATC, Tactical Callsign
- Side #s
- Crews (Mission Commander / Alternate)
- A/A TACAN
- Loadout / SMS
Times
- Walk / Start / Check-in / Taxi / Takeoff / Land / Debrief
Mission Comm Plan
- Pri / Aux / HQ / Secure / JVA/B
- Controlling Agencies
Flight Plan / Waypoint Plan
- Route / Sequences / A/A Wypt. / Ref. Wypt / Geo Refs
RNP / RNAV
Weather / NOTAMs
- Launch / Mission / Recovery / Divert
- Sun / Moon / Clouds / Flt Lvl Winds / Water/Air Temp
Joker / Bingo / Fuel Ladder

Preflight

Aircraft
Ordnance

Ground / Deck

Line/Deck & Start Procedures
Final Checks
Clearance
Arming (Location / Procedures)
Marshal
Check-in
- Frequency / JV A/B / Link 16 F/F / Nav/Alpha Check
Taxi

Takeoff / Launch

Duty Runway / Ship's Position / Ship's Heading
Type Takeoff
Gross Weight / NWLO / T/O / Distance / Abort
Catapult Endspeed / Trim (asymmetrical)
Takeoff Checks
Departure Procedures / Case Departure

En Route

Rendezvous
Formation / Speed
Route of Flight

Op Area

Range Time / Altitude / Restrictions / Information
Range Controlling Agency / Event Number
Entry / Exit Procedures

Tanker

Callsign / Time / Location / Altitude / Frequency
A/A TACAN / Offload
Tanker Bingo / Fallout / Divert

RTB / Recovery

Rendezvous
Battle Damage Checks
Formation
Controlling Agency
Route of Flight
Airfield Recovery Procedures
PIM / Ship Recovery Procedures / Max Trap
- Case Recovery / Marshal / Recovery Time
Type Entry / Landing

Post Landing

Clearing Landing Area / Configuration Changes
Communication
Taxi / De-arming / Parking
Hot pits / Hot switch

Contingencies

Allowable Slide Time
Fallouts / Spares
Degraded Radar / Sensors / Weapon
Go / No Go Criteria
Hung / Unexpended Ordnance
Weather

Emergencies

Abort / Arresting Gear (location)
Loss of Brakes
Emergency Catapult Flyaway
Inflight Emergencies / System Failures
- Procedures / Communication
Lost Sight Procedures
NORDO / LCLS Point
Midair / Bird Strike
Divert / Bingo
- IMC / Arresting Gear
Ejection / SAR Checklist / On Scene Commander (OSC)

Training Rules

Admin Questions

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Avionics

Comm

- KY-58 / DCS / HQ

IFF

- Modes / Interrogation

ROE

- Program

Radar

- Band / Channel / Mate / Setup / Compatibility

ALE-47

- Loadout / Programs

Link 16

- NTR / Offset / Nets / TNs / NPG Channels
- Member / Donor / EW Donor Gameplan

JTT-R

- Broadcast Satellite

AEA MDB

- Multiple MDBs

SA Page

- Points / Lines / Areas / Reject Settings

TSD

- Geographic Overlays

TAMMAC

JHMCS Setup

CVRS

- Pilot / EWO
- Displays / Times

Altitude Warnings

- BALT / Radar / RALT

Selective Jettison Setup

Crypto Requirements

- KY-58, DCS
- Have Quick
- Link 16
- JTT-R
- GPS
- Mode 4
- Weapons

Tac Admin

G-Warm

Combat Systems Check

- APG-79 / ALE-47 / ALQ-99 / ALQ-218

FENCE In / Alibis

Range Check-In / Altimeter

AIC Check-In

- Alpha Check / Alibis / Updates/Words

Expected War Type

Environmentals

- Bandit recommendations

War Call

SPINS

Run Set-ups

- PADS

- Fights On Comm / KIO Comm

- KIO vs. Terminate

Op Checks

FENCE Out

Tac Admin Questions

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Mission

Commander's Intent / Mission Objectives
SEAD Objectives / Training Objectives
Mission Timeline / Mission Phases
Blue Force Composition
ALR

- Mission
- EA-18G

ROE

- EA
 - Radar (Ground/Air)
 - Comm (Ground/Air)
- ARM
- A/A

Enemy Order of Battle (EOB)

- IADS Doctrine
 - MEZ / FEZ / JEZ
- Early Warning / Battle Management Assets
- Defensive Missile Order of Battle (DMOB)
 - Located / Unlocated / Naming Convention
 - Shot Doctrine
- Air Order of Battle (AOB)
 - Aircraft / Loadout / Location(s)
- Naval Order of Battle (NOB)
 - Formation / Doctrine / Location(s)
 - Sensors / Weapons
 - External Cueing

Multi-Growler Coordination

Formation / Altitude / Airspeed

Position / Cap

- ES Profile
- EA Profile
- Maritime Profiles / Stationing
 - SSC / WAS / C-ISRT / CTTG / FAC/FIAC

Link SA Growler (Priority EA-18G Track Number)

EMI Effects on Coordination

- Comm / Nav / Sensors / Weapons

Target / PE / Geo based coordination

Contingencies

Tactical Crew Coordination

Responsibilities (Sensors / Weapons)

Mindset / Transitions

- AEA / A/A / Combined
- Comm / Displays / CVRS
- Expected critical points

Electronic Support

Initialization

- FR/AZ / ELOG
 - DCLTR / Bands
- TSD
 - DCLTR / FLTR / Presets
- JTT-R
 - FRCS
 - GLF / CISF / USPF / Phase Association

Signals of Interest (SOI)

- Receiver Activations (RA / ACT / DEACT / NU)
- Priority Emitters
 - ENGEO / Save tag
- Expected Ambiguities
 - Parametrics / Audio / Location
 - Purge Single
- CCS
 - Emitter Libraries
 - Activations (PA / DO)

SIGINT ID Authority (SIA)

- Lowdown
- Color / Tag

Threat Reporting

- Voice
 - Criteria
 - Location Reference (B/E, DP/IP, etc.)
- Link 16
 - Criteria
 - Message Contracts / Message Allegiance
 - J14.0
 - J12.6 (A/G)
 - Target Points
 - J3.7
 - J3.5, J3.3

Precision Targeting (PT)

- Requirements
- Procedures
- Reporting

Contingencies

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CAS Support

Ground Commander Objectives

Friendly Situation / Current SITREP

Map Review

- FLOT / FEBA
- FSCM
 - ARM Considerations
- CP / IP / EP
- Terrain / Minimum Safe Altitude
- Target Area

C3 Plan

- Frequency Plan (Color Card)
- Agencies (DASC / ASOC / JTAC)
 - Codewords / Authentication
 - Check-in / SITREP Updates
 - CAS Communications
 - Checkout
- Type Control
- Pre-planned 9 lines / Keyhole CAS template

EA-18G Coordination

- Contracts
- Stationing / Altitude / Airspeed
- PE(s)
- CAS Page
 - TCC
 - Coordinate format / MGRS (Ref Waypoint)
 - 9 line entry / Waypoints 46-50 / Seq L
- Execution
 - EA / ARM Priorities
 - Timing / CPA / Alignment
 - A/G Designation
 - Striker Target Area Maneuvers

Dynamic Targeting

DT Mission Objectives

ROE / CID Review

Coordination / Contracts

Target(s) Description

F2T2EA

- Tasking Authority / Comm Flow
- EA-18G Role(s)

SCAARR Checklist

SEAD 5 Line

Destructive SEAD Gameplan

- Formation / Composition

Maritime Employment

CSG Status

- Threat Warning Condition
- Weapon Control Status
- Operating Environment / Threat Environment

SSC

- Targets / Tasking
 - VOI / COI / CCOI
 - Category / Class / Type
 - Merchant Groups
- Brevity / Declaration Terms
- Localization
 - Sensor Correlation / Handoff
 - ALQ-218 / APG-79 / JTT-R
 - Visual ID
 - Quick RIG / Full RIG
- Offboard Coordination
 - ISR Assets / Capes
 - MAC / Capes
 - Reporting Contracts
 - Confidence Levels
 - Link 16

WAS

- Attack Axis / Timing
- Ingress / Egress Profile
- EA / ARM Priorities

C-ISRT / CTTG

- TACSIT
 - CSG Posture
 - TACSIT Authority
 - EA-18G Priorities / Positioning
- Codewords
- Engagement Zones
 - MEZ / FEZ / JEZ / SDZ
- EA / ARM Priorities

FAC / FIAC

- Engagement Zones
 - AEZ / DEZ / SEZ
- EA-18G Positioning
- Escalatory Responses
- EA Priorities
- Sledgehammer

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Electronic Attack

Jam Control Authority (JCA)
Jam Initiate Authority (JIA)
JTAT / JRFL
JTAR / EARF
MDB Phases
Site/System construct
MPLAN modifications
RA Mode/Zones
JX On/Off Times / EA Notes/1vMany assignments

Radar Assignments

- Transmitter Loadout
- Name / Symbol / Frequency / Coverage / Stabilization
- Pre / Post Detection
- HOJ / TOJ Considerations
- Priority Alignment Emitter(s)
 - Requirements / JER / Airframe masking

-
- Time or Event based changes to:
 - Assignment
 - Priority Alignment Emitter
 - PE

Comms Assignments

- UEU
 - Technique / Frequency / Coverage
 - Critical Rappers
- CCS
 - Technique / Symbol / Frequency / Coverage
 - Critical Rappers
 - MISO
 - CCS Priority
 - ALQ-218 Priority w/JAM100

EMI

- Radar / Comms / Link 16 / GPS / TCN
- Weapon Fratricide

Contingencies

Anti-Radiation Missiles

Threat Tactics
Ambiguities / Decoys

PET

- Targets / JER
- Window
- Shooter(s)
- Shot / MSN Info
- Priority Shots / Fallout

Proactive

- Targets / JER
- Priority Order
- Shooter(s)
- Shot Ranges / Impact Range
- Coordination
- Deconfliction / Sanitization

Reactive

- Targets
- Priorities Order
- Shooter(s)
- Coordination
- Deconfliction / Sanitization

Defensive

- ROE / Criteria

Surface-to-Air Counter Tactics

Avoid

- Located / Unlocated

Minimize

- System ROTs

Suppress

- EA
- ARM

Gameplan

- Missile in Sight
- Missile not in Sight

Defensive Reactions

- RQMD / SAM Weave / SRMD / LDMD
 - Indications
 - Mech

ADA

- Pre-emptive / Reactive
 - High Altitude
 - Low Altitude

Terrain Considerations

Theater Min Alt

Jettison Criteria

- Selective Jettison
- Emergency Jettison

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Air-to-Air Counter Tactics

AEA Mindset

- Threat Timeline
- Expected Tactics
- Timeline Review
- Contracts
- AEA Fighter Escort
 - Attached / Detached
 - Formation / CAP location
 - Commit Criteria
 - Comms / Visuals
- Lean
 - Mechanics / Alignment
- Slide
 - Range (FQ / RQ)
 - Mechanics
 - Comm
- Scram
 - Range (FQ / RQ)
 - Mechanics
 - Comm

A/A Mindset

- Transition
 - Criteria
 - Eliminate EMI
- Timeline Review
- Contracts
 - AIC
 - Fighters
- Targeting
- Employment
- Cold Ops
- Notch Timing / Mechanics
- Merge considerations
- Delouse Options
- Jettison Criteria
- Reset Criteria

Combined Mindset

- Responsibilities
- TCC

Contingencies

No go Criteria

SEAD

EA-18G

- Radar / Sensor / Weapon

ALQ-99

Contingencies

Wounded Bird

Downed Aircraft

Unlucky Jet (training)

Red Monkey (training)

Alternate Mission

Recap

Keys to Success

Overall Questions

Walk Time

Subj: Zapper 21 Cockpit Video Recording System (CVRS) Transcription
of Skydrawing Incident

The following is a transcribed excerpt from the Zapper 21 CVRS. The excerpt contains intercom system (ICS) conversation between LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) in Zapper21. LCDR (b) (3) (A)'s transmission from Zapper 22 concerning the skydrawing was also recorded.

20:40:25(Z)

EWO: Draw a giant penis. That would be awesome.

Pilot: What did you do on your flight? Oh, we turned dinosaurs into sky penises.

E: Dude, that's awesome.

P: I love it how it just stays too.

E: Yea. You should totally try to draw a penis.

P: I wouldn't even know if I know how. I could definitely draw one, that would be easy.

E: They come back to join on us, they would be like what the fuck?

P: I could basically draw a figure eight and turn around and come back. I'm gonna go down, grab some speed and hopefully get out of the contrail layer so they're not connected to each other.

E: Multiple aircraft passing through the Roosevelt/Republic airspace reported sighting of a giant [garbled].

P: Dude, that would be so funny, airliner's coming back on their way into Seattle, just this big, fucking, giant penis. We could almost draw a vein in the middle of it, too. I feel like [cross talk].

E: In the middle [cross talk / laughter]

P: Alright, let's come up like this. Alright, we're probably getting close to starting mark. [Garbled] [Comment about Link-16 data] and stuff [garbled]. You see them back there?

E: I'm looking.

P: Oh yea, I think I see it.

E: Coming out now?

P: It's hard to tell.

E: We're definitely marking. Not as heavily as before, though.

P: Oh god. Go up a little higher?

E: Maybe [Garbled]

P: Somehow ripped off my American flag patch, it got stuck to my riser.

P: I don't know [Garbled] strange phenomenon.

E: Oh, we're definitely marking now, big time.

P: Alright, maybe we just had to be closer to these clouds.

P: Balls are going to be a little lopsided.

E: [Laugh] I hope it [Garbled] enough that I can get a picture of it.

P: So weird.

E: [Garbled] on the ground down there like, what's he drawing? It's a message [Garbled].

P: It's a giant pecker [cross talk].

E: Ah, there's [Garbled] man.

P: Balls are complete. I just gotta navigate a little bit over here for the shaft.

E: Which way is the shaft going?

P: The shaft will go to the left. So, I'll have to bust into their airspace a little bit, but it's not [cross talk].

E: It's gonna be a wide shaft.

P: I don't wanna make it just like 3 balls.

E: [Laughter] Yeah. You're probably going to sharp left and then draw it back.

P: Alright.

E: Here we go, let's do it. Oh, the head of that penis is going to be thick.

P: Clouds coming out right now. Alright, now I've gotta target my approach.

P: Some like Chinese weather satellite right now that's like "What the fuck?"

E: [Garbled] Penis.

P: Alright and then, to get out of this, I'm gonna go like down and to the right. And we'll come back up over the top try to take a look at it.

E: I have a feeling the balls will have dissipated by then.

P: It's possible.

E: [Garbled] figure out a way to go up the middle, cause then we could [Garbled] down the bottom, make it look like a [Garbled].

E: Aw, there's nothing. I don't think we're conning anymore. Aw, it's a giant [cross talk].

P: Coming up to the left.

E: Ok, hurry up.

P: Oh my god.

E: Keep it coming, keep it coming so I can get a picture.

[Laughter]

P: Oh yes, that was fucking amazing.

[Cross talk]

E: Try to go down a little bit, so like get a little more distance from it.

P: Ok, let me split S [Garbled].

E: Aw, perfect.

P: This is so obvious

E: That's a dick.

P: I'm gonna come around to the left.

E: Dude, I'm amazed that this stayed.

[Cross talk]

E: Mishap pilot alpha said, "Dude, I'm gonna draw a dick." Mishap pilot...EWO alpha said, "Yup, that's a great idea."

P: I hope there's someone on the ground [cross talk]

E: I really want them to join up.

P: [Garbled] Don't even say anything. See if they notice.

E: Bring around to the left so we can go right underneath it.

Zapper 22 EWO: Your artwork is amazing.

E: Glad you guys noticed.

20:54:05(Z)



VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)

Commanding Officer

(b) (3) (A)

Executive Officer

Day: Thursday, 16 Nov 2017
JD / TZ: 7320 / -8
Sorties / Hours: 5 / 7.5
Flown/Grant(%): 267.4 / 392.0 (68.2%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 27.9 / 29.9



Sunrise: 0720
Sunset: 1630
Moonrise: 0512
Moonset: 1611
Illumination: 5 %

SMOOTH

SDO

(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF

AMEC (b) (3) (A)

SCHEDULE WRITER

(b) (3)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S FAIROPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1 86316	ZAPPR 11 OKNA	501 503	0745 / 0945 / 1055	KNUW KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) 1A9	3 20.3	(b) (3) (A) 1000-1100	TAC-1 1, 2, 3	0944 / 1107 / 1.4 0939 / 1100 / 1.4
1 86316	ZAPPR 13 OKNA	504	0745 / 0945 / 1055	KNUW KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) 1A9	3 20.3	(b) (3) (A) 1000-1100	TAC-1 2, 3	0947 / 1102 / 1.3
HP / HS 2 A/C FROM EVT 1 INTO EVT 2											
2 86350	ZAPPR 21 OKNA	501 503	1045 / 1215 / 1345	KNUW KNUW	(b) (3) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) 1A9	3 20.3	(b) (3) (A) 1200-1330	TAC-1 2	1200 / 1347 / 1.8 1200 / 1335 / 1.6
* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR											
SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): 5 / 0 / 5 SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): 5 / 0 / 5 FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): 7.5 / 0.0 / 7.5											

FLIGHT/SIMULATOR NOTES:

- GWTP 3.8F FOR (b) (3)
- QUIET HOURS 1100-1200L - STRAIGHT-IN, FULL STOP LANDINGS ONLY. AVOID HANGAR 5 TO MAX EXTENT PRACTICAL.
- ZAPPR 11 AND ZAPPR 13 MARSA

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
2. 1300 - 1330	OPS / MX MEETING	OPS	(b) (3) (b) (3) AVCM (b) (3)
3. 1330 - 1400	DET MEETING	READY ROOM	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) ADC (b) (3) ADC (b) (3)
4. 1400 - 1500	PB4T	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) CDR (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3)
5. 1500 - 1545	DH MEETING	READY ROOM	(b) (3) (b) (3)
6. 1500 - 1600	FEP PT	BASE GYM	CDR (b) (3) CDR (b) (3) CMDCM (b) (3) ALL DEPT HEADS
7. 1600 - 1630	MPA OUTBRIEF	READY ROOM	ALL REQUIRED
8. 1830 - 2030	FAREWELL	DEBRIEF LOCATION 4	CO, XO, (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) AVCM (b) (3) AVCM (b) (3)

QUESTIONS:

NATOPS: TRUE/FALSE: SWITCHING VALVE OPERATION IS COMPLETELY HYDRO-MECHANICAL, SEPARATE FROM ELECTRICAL INPUTS OR RESET COMMANDS. AS MECHANIZED, THERE IS NO HAZARD ASSOCIATED WITH MULTIPLE RESET ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN AN X'ED SURFACE FOLLOWING A HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT FAILURE.

SOP: WHAT CRITERIA MUST BE MET TO PERFORM A PRACTICE SECTION LANDING?

TACTICS: DEFINE CAT IV AIRCRAFT?

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

(b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3)

Submitted By:

(b) (3) (A)

Reviewed By:

(b) (3) (A)


Approved By:

(b) (3) (A)

Schedule Writer

Assistant Operations Officer

Commanding Officer



Enclosure (10)

From: LT (b) (3) (A) VAQ-130 TRAINING OFFICER
To: CAPT (b) (3) (A)

Subj: VAQ-130 COCKPIT VIDEO RECORDING FROM 16 NOVEMBER

The CVRS recording from aircraft 501 (the lead aircraft crewed by LT (b) (3) and LT (b) (3) from 16 November 2017 is being held at VAQ-130. VAQ-130 will maintain the recording as long as required or requested. The recording can be transferred by classified courier upon request.

Aircraft 503 (the wing aircraft crewed by LTJG (b) (3) (A) and LCDR (b) (3) CVRS did not record any video or audio data to the RMM. The aircrew reported a RMMFL (RMM Full) advisory. The RMM was downloaded and examined and there was no data from the 16th of November.

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

/ 20 NOV 2017

20 NOV 17

From: CDR (b) (3) (A) Executive Officer, VAQ-130
To: CAPT (b) (3) (A) PDCAG, CVW-1

SUBJECT: Summary of Interview

1. Summary of events from the afternoon of 16 NOV 17.

On the afternoon of 16 Nov I was standing in the Ready Room and the SDO handed me the duty phone stating the Deputy Commodore, CAPT (b) (3) (A), was on the line and wanted to speak to me or my commanding Officer, CDR (b) (3) (A). I answered the call because CDR (b) (3) (A) was not in the room. CAPT (b) (3) (A) asked me if we had any jets airborne in the Okanagan MOA at approximately 1245L. I consulted the flight schedule and confirmed for him that we did indeed have two aircraft in that MOA during that time and I asked if there was anything we needed to answer for. CAPT (b) (3) (A) responded that yes there would be something to answer for and ordered me to secure the tapes from the flight for later download and review. He then directed me to check my email because he had sent me a message. I ordered the SDO to identify the tapes and sequester them directly and that no one was to touch them or look at them until further notice.

On my way to my office I stopped by the Safety Office where LTJG (b) (3) (A) was sitting. He was the pilot of the wing aircraft for that flight. I asked him if the flight had committed any of the normal infractions that can happen when working in a MOA. Did the flight spill out of the airspace, did the flight go faster than Mach 1.0, or did the flight fly at a low level over anyone's home? LTJG (b) (3) (A) told me that none of those things happened and was confused about why CVWP would be contacting the squadron about the flight.

Passing the Admin Officer's office I spotted LT (b) (3) (A) who was the pilot of the lead aircraft for that event. I also called down the hallway for LT (b) (3) (A) the lead aircraft EWO, who came to the office immediately. I asked both of them the same question I asked LT (b) (3) (A) and from the look on their faces it was evident they both knew what I was asking about. LT (b) (3) (A) described that he and LT (b) (3) (A) had completed their SEAD training mission and the flight had split up because they had extra gas. At the altitude they were working, between 22,000 and 25,000 feet, there were persistent contrails. LT (b) (3) (A) then admitted to me that it was his idea that they draw a penis using the contrails in the sky. LT (b) (3) (A) went on to describe the discussion they had in the cockpit of how to execute the drawing and how after they were complete they couldn't believe it was still visible. They both apologized and were at once remorseful. I brought them into my office and opened the email from CAPT (b) (3) (A) and discovered he had sent pictures that had been taken from the ground of the drawing. I immediately sent one of them to find CDR (b) (3) (A) and bring him to my office.

CDR (b) (3) (A) was at that time in the Ready Room and our squadron MPA inspection out-brief was about to begin with the CVWP inspection team. He came into my office and asked what was going on. I showed him the pictures, provided him with the context, and he was immediately furious. He asked both LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A) if they had any idea what the ramification of their actions were going to be. Then he sent them to the Admin office with an order not to leave the hangar and started making phone calls to CVW-3 and CVWP. Later we were called to meet with the Commodore, CAPT (b) (3) (A) face-to-face.

2. My evaluation of LT (b) (3) (A) and LT (b) (3) (A)

LT (b) and LT (b) (3) have been, until this incident, fine officers and capable aviators. My opinion is that they are conscientious, trustworthy, and that they care about the mission and the people they work with. They 100% need to be held accountable, but if they are allowed to continue in naval aviation this is not a mistake they will repeat. I think they have showed character under pressure because at no time in my discussion with them did they attempt to obscure the truth, deflect blame, or equivocate. They have both apologized to me personally.

3. My evaluation of the possibility of LT (b) and LT (b) (3) moving on from this mistake.

They both have the ability to move on from this mistake and continue to be an asset to the Navy. I have been part of the squadron for a little over a year and I have observed them both on a combat deployment and back here at our home station. In that time, minus the current circumstance, they have never given me a reason to doubt their trustworthiness or their resolve to be officers in the Navy. I feel they will learn from this and can be trusted in the future.

4. My evaluation of the culture of the squadron and the humor used in the Ready Room.

I do not believe we have a toxic culture in the Zappers. I do not believe we have a culture that accepts or condones sexual harassment or intolerance. CDR (b) (3) has taken great pains to instill a sense of squadron pride with a simultaneous sense of respect for all people inside and outside this unit. The humor in the ready room is always designed to include people and not exclude anyone. It is used as a tool through good natured ribbing to build camaraderie among the members of the Ready Room.

Very respectfully,

(b) (3) (A)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDING OFFICER
ELECTRONIC ATTACK SQUADRON ONE THREE ZERO
3760 N CHARLES PORTER AVE
OAK HARBOR WA 98278

20 Nov 2017

From: Commanding Officer, Electronic attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO
To: CAPT (b) (3) (A) USN

Subj: EVENTS OF 16 NOVEMBER 2017

1. On 16 November 2017 I was not scheduled to fly or to be in a simulator. I concluded a PB4T meeting and a department head meeting and was walking the shops as is my habit at shift change on a Thursday prior, since Night Check does not work on Fridays. At approximately 1555 I came upstairs for our 1600 MPA Outbrief with CWPW personnel. That meeting did not make our signed schedule but was after the fact written into our plan.
2. I was grabbed by the XO prior to going into the outbrief in the ready room. He showed me the pictures taken from the ground that was sent from the Deputy Commodore. I left the room, informed the MPA outbrief to continue without me and brought the two LTs, OPSO and XO into my office. We then had a one way conversation about the magnitude of their mistake and my disappointment. That conversation went on for approximately five minutes. At that point I left and drove the XO and myself to the CVWP offices where I briefed the commodore on what I knew and my immediate plans. I informed my operational chain of command via phone call but they had already been notified by the Deputy Commodore. We released a SITREP based on the expected public affairs interest.
3. The following morning I met with the two LTs at 0800. We had an AOM at 0830. At approximately 1100 I was notified by CAG that we were to conduct a FNAB that would be adjudicated by the Air Boss and "completed by Wednesday." I got the appropriate members of the board and brought them into our spaces by 1330. At 1400 I spoke with the two aviators and the members of their respective boards. I explained the process, procedures, and requirements. I emphasized that while the timeline was compressed they were to do a complete and thorough investigation and would be provided with whatever they needed to complete their tasking as per instruction. With that, the retreated to two separate spaces and began their process. Other than ensuring their administrative support and my testimony, I was removed from the FENAB board process until the senior member of each board came in my office individually and informed of their A(4) assessment.
4. On Saturday they concluded their work and presented me with their official findings. I endorsed the packages and concurred with the findings. I wrote the following information about their previous performance. Regarding LT (b) (3) (A) *Prior to this incident I have never had an issue with LT (b) (3) (A)'s judgement, skill, decision making, or professionalism as an officer and aviator. Conversely, I met him when I was going through the FRS as a PXO and immediately recognized in him the characteristics I wanted to build my squadron around. He and I flew seven combat*

Enclosure (13)

Subj: EVENTS OF 16 NOVEMBER 2017

missions together – more than any other EWO I flew with. On the ground he is an outstanding DIVO. His brother was enlisted and I believe that he has a higher maturity and understanding of the responsibilities of an officer. Ironically, he is the officer most sensitive and proactive in our public affairs outreach and ability to positively interact with the civilian population. He has never been in trouble, and in fact is more often the voice of reason in the Ready Room. He is the consummate teammate, wingman, EWO and up until this point has been quite frankly, my best Junior Officer. I stand by that assessment. Regarding LT (b) (3): This is the first incident that has ever caused me to question LT (b) (3)'s judgement and professionalism as an Officer and Naval Aviator. On the ground, he graduated from Schedules Officer straight to Assistant Operations Officer, entrusted with managing DRRS-N throughout deployment and sustainment. To be blunt, LT (b) (3) is a "whiz kid" who managed our training and readiness with higher efficiency and effectiveness than anyone else I have seen in a squadron. I have never questioned his skill in the aircraft; he is a good pilot and a competent section lead. I would rate him as our most conservative pilot. He has a low tolerance for risk, he effectively briefs and implements the principles of ORM, and his NATOPS knowledge is excellent. He is assertive in the jet, overcoming his naturally shy and introverted demeanor. I stand by that assessment.

5. I have very strong feelings about this squadron having spent the significant chunk of my professional career in VAQ-130. I was a DH here from 2010-2013 and then returned as XO in 2015. I was a member of the EA-18G FIT, and did the acceptance flight on four of the five aircraft still on our flight line. There are still troops in this squadron that I checked in when I was MO. I say all that, to emphasize that more than any other squadron in the US Navy the climate and culture of VAQ-130 is a product of my leadership and personality. This has made this event even more demoralizing from that standpoint I am nevertheless incredibly proud of the team I have built. I am most proud of the delta in CMEQ survey performance between when I joined the squadron and our most recent survey. I not only require compliance with equal opportunity programs, we have proactively sought out microinequities and the cultural problems that are in the forefront of national dialogue with the hope of improving upward mobility and social equity among the Zappers. Despite these recent events, I am convinced we have been successful in building a cohesive and equitable team.

(b) (3) (A)



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-----OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS-----

RTTUZYUW RHOIAAA0001 3210243-UUUU--RHSSSUU.

ZNR UUUUU

R 170242Z NOV 17

FM VAQRON ONE THREE ZERO

TO COMVAQWINGPAC WHIDBEY ISLAND WA

COMCARAIRWING THREE

CNO WASHINGTON DC

CHINFO WASHINGTON DC

INFO CHINFO WASHINGTON DC

CNIC WASHINGTON DC

COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA

COMNAVAIRFOR SAN DIEGO CA

COMNAVREG NW SILVERDALE WA

NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC

NAVCRIMINVSERVFO NORTHWEST PUGET SOUND WA

VAQRON ONE THREE ZERO

BT

UNCLAS

PASS TO OFFICE CODES:

TO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//

CHINFO WASHINGTON DC//00//

INFO CHINFO WASHINGTON DC//00//

SECINFO/U/-//

MSGID/OPREP-3NUS,USMTF,2017/VAQRON ONE THREE ZERO/002//

REF/A/DOC/CNO/31MAY2016//

AMPN/REF A IS OPNAVINST F3100.6J CH-3 SPECIAL INCIDENT REPORTING PROCEDURES//

FLAGWORD/NAVY BLUE//

TIMELOC/162045NOV2017/OKANAGAN MOA ABOVE EASTERN WA//

GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/

1. INCIDENT: AIRBORNE EVENT ATTRACTING MEDIA ATTENTION
2. DATE OF INCIDENT: 16NOV2017
3. TIME OF INCIDENT: 1245L
4. LOCATION OF INCIDENT: OKANAGAN MOA ABOVE EASTERN WA
5. INCIDENT: AIRCREW MANEUVERED AN EA-18G AIRCRAFT IN A PATTERN THAT RESULTED IN CONTRAILS DEPICTING AN OBSCENE SYMBOL WHEN VIEWED FROM THE GROUND. MEDIA ATTENTION IS EXPECTED.
6. POC: LCDR ZEUNER, COMM 360-257-6182, DSN 820-6182, KEITH.ZEUNER(AT)NAVY.MIL//

BT

#0001

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<DmdsReleaser>JUSTICE.NICHOLAS.JAMES.1472479519</DmdsReleaser>

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Subj: LT (b)(3) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by LT (b)(3), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO, on 20 NOV 2017 concerning the flight incident that occurred on 16 NOV 2017 that were not already addressed in his written statement.

LT (b)(3) thinks that VAQ-130 is the envy of the flightline. The front office is known to be great and would never have approved of the skydrawing incident. "This was a stupid and isolated incident. Not indicative of culture."

LT (b)(3) stated that drawing a phallic-shaped object with contrails was never discussed prior to the 16 Nov17 flight.

Subj: LCDR (b) (3) (A) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by LCDR (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO, on 20 NOV 2017 concerning the flight incident that occurred on 16 NOV 2017 that were not already addressed in his written statement.

When asked about the existence of a cavalier attitude in the squadron, LCDR (b) (3) (A) said, "No, I think this squadron is the best on the flightline." The 16 Nov 17 incident is not normal behavior for the squadron.

LCDR (b) (3) (A) stated the CO and XO are approachable and respected.

LCDR (b) (3) (A) stated that the Ready Room culture is great, much better than his JO experience. He is openly gay and is very comfortable in the squadron and bringing his husband to squadron events.

Regarding flight hour execution, LCDR (b) (3) (A) said, "We don't just burn holes in the sky."

In conclusion, he stated, "This was a really bad decision by some really good guys in a really good squadron."

Subj: LT (b) (3) (A) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by LT (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO Training Officer, on 20 NOV 2017.

LT (b) (3) (A) checked into VAQ-130 on 28 AUG 2017. When asked to classify the Ready Room environment, LT (b) (3) (A) said that the junior officers respect the Department Heads. There are no outcasts or animosity. The Ready Room is better now than it was when he was a junior officer in VAQ-130. LT (b) (3) (A) said, "This is the best Command I've seen."

When questioned about the existence of a cavalier attitude with in the squadron, LT (b) (3) (A) said that there was not. VAQ-130 personnel abide by applicable instructions.

Concerning the interaction between squadron aircrew and maintenance personnel, LT (b) (3) (A) said, "[It's] the best I've seen."

When asked about the aircrew involved in the 16 NOV flight incident, LT (b) (3) (A) said that LT (b) (3) (A) is a "top level performer". LT (b) (3) (A) does his job well although he may not desire a long term career in Naval Aviation. LT (b) (3) (A) did not expect this type of behavior from LT (b) (3) (A).

LT (b) (3) (A) stated that LT (b) (3) (A) has demonstrated the performance of a normal junior officer.

Subj: LTJG (b) (3) (A) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by LTJG (b) (3) (A) Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130) Aviation Maintenance Officer, on 20 NOV 2017.

LTJG (b) (3) (A) checked into VAQ-130 on 28 FEB 2017. Concerning the Command climate, he said that there are just a few disgruntle people, but almost everyone loves the squadron. The officers and chief petty officers work well together. As AMO, he is working to increase the number of female leaders in the Command.

When asked about the 16 NOV contrail drawing, LTJG (b) (3) (A) thinks that it was an isolated incident and doesn't reflect accurately on the squadron.

Subj: CMDCM (b) (3) (A) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by CMDCM (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130) Command Master Chief, on 20 NOV 2017.

CMDCM (b) (3) (A) checked into VAQ-130 in NOV 2016. "[He] is lucky to get this Command."

He said that the Chief's Mess gets along well. They have a weekly meeting which is a constructive way to address any issues that may cause discontent. CMDCM (b) (3) (A) doesn't believe that the Command discriminates against any individual or group.

CMDCM (b) (3) (A) discussed an incident that occurred in a work center where males were having an inappropriate conversation. A female who was present raised the issue and leadership corrected it. CMDCM (b) (3) (A) said that sailors feel comfortable raising concerns and they know that leadership will address those concerns.

Subj: AVCM (b) (3) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by AVCM (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO Maintenance Master Chief Petty Officer, on 20 NOV 2017 concerning the VAQ-130 Command Climate.

AVCM (b) (3) has been at the Command for about 2.5 years. He said that the Command is not perfect, but none are. Command climate surveys have improved and the squadron has great promotion rates. He stated that the Goat Locker is great and sees no concerns or worrying trends.

When asked about the flight incident that occurred 16 NOV, AVCM (b) (3) (A) said, "I was shocked that the guys did what they did."

Subj: AZC (b)(3) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by AZC (b)(3)(A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130), on 20 NOV 2017.

AZC (b)(3) has been in VAQ-130 for just over three years and stated the Command climate is "really good". When asked about her experience as the only female E-6 and above, she said, "Females get a fair shake." She was pleased that a female E-6 who she mentors just received orders to VAQ-130. She explained that decisions are based on competency and work ethic rather than sex or race. Most females in the Command aren't shy about having their voices heard.

Subj: ATAN (b) (3) (A) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by ATAN (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130), on 20 NOV 2017.

ATAN (b) (3) (A) checked into VAQ-130 in FEB 2017. This is her first squadron and she feels that her experience is similar to her former C School classmates who are now in operational units. She said, "I like it here," when asked about her time at VAQ-130.

ATAN (b) (3) voluntarily brought up the fact that she has gone to Captain's Mast while in VAQ-130. She said that she was treated fairly and the squadron "had her back" rather than ostracizing her.

Overall, ATAN (b) (3) (A) thinks that females are treated well at the Command and she would feel comfortable approaching senior personnel if she had a problem.

Subj: YN1 (b) (3) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by YN1 (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130), on 20 NOV 2017.

YN1 (b) (3) checked into VAQ-130 in JUN 2015 and is the current Squadron Sailor of the Year. He refers to VAQ-130 as "a family". He doesn't see any division among the first class petty officers and believes they have a good relationship with the Chief's Mess. YN1 (b) (3) said that all sailors are treated fairly regardless of sex or ethnicity.



(b) (3) (A)
Commanding Officer

VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)
Executive Officer

Day: Thursday, 28 Sep 2017
Julian: 7271
Time zone: -7
Sorties: 4
Hours: 8.0
Pilot / EWO Avg 36.9 / 35.4



Sunrise: 0706
Sunset: 1855
Moonrise: 1516
Moonset: 0000
Illumination: 52 %

SDO
(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF
(b) (3) (A)

SCHEDULE WRITER
(b)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S FAIROPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	THNDR 11 50_	0800 / 1000 / 1200	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b)	INST NAV	1	DD-175	VAQ-135	1, 2, 3	/ / /
	DD-175 50_		KNTD	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	1A2	17.1				/ / /
2	ZAPPR 11 50_	0830 / 1000 / 1200	KNUW	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	INST NAV	1	DD-175		4, 5	/ / /
	DD-175		KBOI	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	1A2	17.1				/ / /
3	ZAPPR 11 50_	1300 / 1400 / 1600	KBOI	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	INST NAV	1	DD-175			/ / /
	DD-175		KNUW	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	1A2	17.1				/ / /

* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR

SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): / / / SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): / / / FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): / / /

FLIGHT NOTES:

1. MASS BRIEF IN VAQ-135 READY ROOM. LED BY VAQ-135
2. NTD PPR: 09038
3. PARK AT NORTH RAMP
4. TURNING SPARE FOR EVT 1 UNTIL EVT 1 LAUNCHES
5. BOI PPR: 7271ZAPPR

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0800 - 0830	SEAT BRIEF	AME SHOP	CDR (b) (3) (b) (3)
2. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
3. 1000 - 1015	COFFEE WITH SKIPPER	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AZ2 (b) (3)
4. 1300 - 1330	SEAT BRIEF	AME SHOP	(b) (3)
5. 1600 - 1700	LEX TURN	HANGAR	(b) (3) AD3 (b) (3) AD3 (b) (3)

QUESTIONS:

NATOPS: THE L/R BLD OFF CAUTIONS INDICATE THAT THE CORRESPONDING PRIMARY BLEED AIR SHUTOFF VALVE(S) ARE COMMANDED
THE CAUTIONS ARE / ARE NOT (CIRCLE ONE) AN INDICATION OF ACTUAL VALVE POSITION.

SOP: DURING SECTION TAKEOFF, WHAT VISUAL SIGNAL IS USED TO RAISE THE GEAR AND FLAPS? TO DESELECT AB?

TACTICS: A/A WEAPONS THAT THE SU-27 CAN EMPLOY?

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

NONE / (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (A)

Submitted By:

(b) (3) (A)

Schedule Writer

Reviewed By:

(b) (3) (A)

Operations Officer

Approved By:

(b) (3) (A)

Commanding Officer



(b) (3) (A)
Commanding Officer

VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)
Executive Officer

Day: Tuesday, 03 Oct 2017
Julian: 7276
Time zone: -7
Sorties: 6
Hours: 9.0
Flown/Grant(%) 8.5 / 390.0 (2.2%)
Pilot / EWO Avg 0.0 / 0.0



Sunrise: 0713
Sunset: 1845
Moonrise: 1812
Moonset: 0435
Illumination: 93 %

SDO

(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF

(b) (3) (A)

SCHEDULE WRITER

(b)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S	FAIROPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO	ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	ZAPPR 11	50		0800 / 0930 / 1100	KNUW	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	ME	1	W-237 A/B	TAC-2	/ / /
84310	BOAT3	50			KNUW	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A9	17.1	0945 - 1045		/ / /
HP / HS 2 AC FROM EVT 1 INTO EVT 2													
2	ZAPPR 21	50		0945 / 1200 / 1330	KNUW	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	ME	1	W-237 A/B	TAC-2	/ / /
84311	DD-175	50			KNUW	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A9	17.1	1215 - 1315	1	/ / /
HP / HS 2 AC FROM EVT 2 INTO EVT 3													
3	ZAPPR 31	50		1300 / 1430 / 1600	KNUW	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	SEAD	1	ROOS/REP	TAC-1	/ / /
84681	ROOSA	50			KNUW	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A9	17.1	1430 - 1515	2	/ / /
* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR													
SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): / / SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): / / FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): / /													

SIMULATOR EVENTS:

EVT	SIM	BRF / T/O / LAND	PILOT	EWO	CONSOLE	TMR	MISSION	NOTES
1	TOFT 204	1415 / 1445 / 1615	AE2 TRIPP AD2 SACK		RITCHEY	1A1	TURN QUAL	3

FLIGHT NOTES:

1. GWTP 3.7F FOR (b) (3) (A)
2. COORDINATED SINGLES
3. MEET AT SIM BUILDING

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0800 - 0930	SURVIVABILITY BRIEFS	EAWS CLASSROOM 4	(b) (3) (h) (3)
2. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
3. 1200 - 1600	MISSION PLANNING	VAULT	(b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) ALL AVAILABLE AIRCREW
4. 1300 - 1315	COFFEE WITH SKIPPER	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AD1 (b) (3)
5. 1400 - 1500	SURVIVABILITY BRIEFS	EAWS CLASSROOM 4	CDR (b) (3)
6. 1600 - 1615	RE-ENLISTMENT	AME SHOP	CDR (b) (3) AME1 (b) (3) ALL INTERESTED

QUESTIONS:

NATOPS: HOW CAN THE AIRCREW TELL WHEN THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER HAS BEEN DISCHARGED?
SOP: WHAT ARE THE DEFAULT BARO SOFTWARE SETTINGS?
TACTICS: DEFINE CHEAPSHOT/PITBULL/TRASHED?

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

NONE / (b) (3) (A)

Submitted By:

(b) (3) (A)

Reviewed By:

(b) (3) (A)

Approved By:

(b) (3) (A)

Schedule Writer

Operations Officer

Commanding Officer



VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)
Commanding Officer

(b) (3) (A)
Executive Officer

Day: Thursday, 19 Oct 2017
JD / TZ: 7292 / -7
Sorties / Hours: 4 / 5.6
Flown / Grant (%): 100.4 / 391.5 (25.6%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 10.6 / 10.9



Sunrise: 0737
Sunset: 1813
Moonrise: 0717
Moonset: 1841
Illumination: 0 %

SDO / ODO (0730 - 1245 / 1245 - 1500)

(b) (3) (A) / (b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF

(b) (3) (A)

SCHEDULE WRITER

(b) (3) (A)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S FAIROPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	ZAPPR 11	50_	0745 / 0930 / 1045	KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	CDR (b) (3) (A)	AACT	1	W-237 A/B	TAC-2	— / — / —
85170	BOAT3	50_		KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A6	17.1	0945-1045	1, 2	— / — / —
2	ZAPPR 21	50_	1115 / 1245 / 1415	KNUW	*CDR (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	SEAD	1	W-237 A/B	TAC-2	— / — / —
85171	BOAT3	50_		KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A9	17.1	1300-1400		— / — / —

* SECTION LEAD; ** DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR

SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): — / — / — SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): — / — / — FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): — / — / —

FLIGHT NOTES:

- GWTP 2.1F FOR (b) (3) (A)
- 30 FLARES FOR (b) (3) (A) 20 FLARES FOR (b) (3) (A)

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0800 - 1500	CRITICAL THINKING COURSE	EAWS CLASSROOM 4	(b) (3) (A)
2. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
3. 0900 - 0915	COFFEE WITH SKIPPER	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) (A) AM2 (b) (3) (A)
4. 0900 - 1500	MISSION PLANNING	EAWS CLASSROOM 1	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)
5. 1000 - 1015	ROBD	TOFT 205	(b) (3) (A)
6. 1300 - 1500	FULL SPEED AHEAD TRAINING	TRAINING CLASSROOM	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) ALL REQUIRED
7. 1500 - 1530	CO LEADERSHIP CLASS	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) (A) ALL FCPOs
8. 1545 - 1615	QUARTERS	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
9. 1615 - 1645	CO LEADERSHIP CLASS	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) (A) ALL CPOs

QUESTIONS:

NATOPS: TRUE/FALSE. PLACING THE BATT SWITCH TO OFF PRIOR TO THE AMBER FLAPS LIGHT ON SHUTDOWN COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED FLIGHT CONTROL MOVEMENT DUE TO RESIDUAL HYDRAULIC PRESSURE AND FCS KEEP-ALIVE CIRCUITRY.

SOP: WHAT CONDITIONS ARE REQUIRED FOR A SECTION TAKEOFF?

TACTICS: SA-6 ENVELOPE?

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

NONE / (b) (3) (A) / (b) (3) (A)

Submitted By:

Reviewed By:

Approved By:

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Schedule Writer

Operations Officer

Commanding Officer



(b) (3) (A)

Commanding Officer

Day: Friday, 17 Nov 2017
JD / TZ: 7321 / -8
Sorties / Hours: 3 / 6.0
Flown / Grant (%): 281.1 / 392.0 (71.7%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 29.3 / 31.4

VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)

Executive Officer

Sunrise: 0722
Sunset: 1629
Moonrise: 0615
Moonset: 1639
Illumination: 1 %

SDO / ODO (0930 - 1400)

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3)

DUTY CHIEF

(b) (3) (A)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S FAIOPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	ZAPPR 11	50	0830 / 1000 / 1200	KNUW	** (b) (3)	(b)	INST NAV	3	DD-175	TAC-1	/ /
	DD-175	50		KLSV	(b) (3)	(b) (3) (A)	1A2	20.3		1, 2	/ /
		50			(b) (3)	(b) (3)					/ /

* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR

SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): / / / SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): / / / FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): / /

SIMULATOR EVENTS:

EVT	SIM	BRF / T/O / LAND	PILOT	EWO	CONSOLE	TMR	MISSION	NOTES
1	TOFT 205	0945 / 1100 / 1245	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	(b) (3) (A)	1A9	SEAD	3, 4, 5
	TOFT 206		(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)				

FLIGHT/SIMULATOR NOTES:

1. KLSV PPR: 321JC201
2. CREWS TAKE 3 DMDs AND 3 RMMs IN ADDITION TO DMD 2, 12, 13 AND RMM 3, 4
3. BRIEF IN VAULT
4. GWTP 3.5S FOR (b) (3)
5. GWTP 2.5S FOR (b) (3) (A)

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0800 - 0900	AEA BRIEFING LAB DROP	VAULT	(b) (3) (A) (b) (3)
2. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
3. 0900 - 0915	COFFEE WITH SKIPPER	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3), AT2 (b) (3)
4. 1300 - 1400	STO BRIEF	CAOC-N	(b) (b) (3) (b) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3)

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

(b) (3) (b) (b) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3)



(b) (3) (A)

Commanding Officer

Day: Saturday, 18 Nov 2017
JD / TZ: 7322 / -8
Sorties / Hours: 3 / 6.0
Flown / Grant (%): 281.1 / 392.0 (71.7%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 29.3 / 31.4



(b) (3) (A)

Executive Officer

Sunrise: 0723
Sunset: 1628
Moonrise: 0718
Moonset: 1710
Illumination: 0 %

SDO

(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF

(b) (3) (A)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S FAIOPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	ZAPPR 11	50_	0830 / 1000 / 1200	KLSV	** (b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	INST NAV	3	DD-175	TAC-1	/ /
	DD-175	50_		KNUW	(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)	1A2	20.3		1	/ /
		50_			(b) (3) (A)	(b) (3) (A)					/ /

* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; INSTRUCTOR

SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): / / / SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): / / / FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): / /

FLIGHT NOTES:

1. VAQ-140 JETS

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)



(b) (3) (A)

Commanding Officer

Day: Sunday, 19 Nov 2017
JD / TZ: 7323 / -8
Sorties / Hours: 0 / 0.0
Flown / Grant (%): 281.1 / 392.0 (71.7%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 29.3 / 31.4



(b) (3) (A)

Executive Officer

Sunrise: 0725
Sunset: 1627
Moonrise: 0818
Moonset: 1745
Illumination: 1 %

SDO

(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF

(b) (3) (A)

****NO FLIGHTS SCHEDULED****

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

(b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A) (b) (3) (A)



VAQ-130 ZAPPERS

FLIGHT SCHEDULE



(b) (3) (A)
Commanding Officer

(b) (3) (A)
Executive Officer

Day: Monday, 20 Nov 2017
JD / TZ: 7324 / -8
Sorties / Hours: 2 / 3.0
Flown / Grant (%): 281.1 / 392.0 (71.7%)
Pilot / EWO Avg: 29.3 / 31.4



Sunrise: 0726
Sunset: 1626
Moonrise: 0914
Moonset: 1825
Illumination: 3 %

SDO
(b) (3) (A)

DUTY CHIEF
(b) (3) (A)

SCHEDULE WRITER
(b) (3)

FLIGHT EVENTS:

EVT #	C/S	FAIROPS	A/C	BRIEF / T/O / LAND	ICAO ICAO	PILOT	EWO	MISSION TMR	ZCL FUEL	RANGE TIMES	TAC NOTES	T/O / LND / TOF
1	ZAPPR 11	50_	0815 / 0945 / 1115	KNUW	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	SEAD	3	W-237 A/B	___ / ___ / ___		
86443	BOAT3			KNUW			1A9	20.3	1000-1100			
HP / HS 1 A/C FROM EVT 1 INTO EVT 2												
2	ZAPPR 21	50_	1030 / 1215 / 1345	KNUW	(b) (3)	(b) (3)	SEAD	3	W-237 A/B	___ / ___ / ___		
86444	BOAT3			KNUW			1A9	20.3	1230-1345			
* SECTION LEAD; **DIVISION LEAD; = GUEST AIRCREW; BRIEFER; \$ SEAD LEAD; / INSTRUCTOR												
SDO: SORTIES SCHED (D/N/TOT): ___ / ___ / ___ SORTIES FLN (D/N/TOT): ___ / ___ / ___ FLT TIME (D/N/TOT): ___ / ___ / ___												

GROUND SCHEDULE:

TIME	EVENT	LOCATION	ATTENDEES
1. 0700 - 0800	AEA BRIEFING LAB	VAULT	(b) (3) (b) (3)
2. 0830 - 0845	FOD WALKDOWN	HANGAR	ALL HANDS
3. 0900 - 1300	MISSION PLANNING	VAULT	(b) (3) (b) (3) ALL AVAILABLE AIRCREW
4. 0900 - 0915	XO CHECK OUT	XO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AMC (b) (3) (A)
5. 0915 - 0930	CO CHECK OUT	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AMC (b) (3) (A)
6. 0915 - 0930	XO CHECK OUT	XO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) REC (b) (3)
7. 0930 - 0945	CO CHECK OUT	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AEC (b) (3)
8. 1000 - 1100	LEADERSHIP TRAINING	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) ALL E-6s
9. 1030 - 1100	XO CHECK OUT	XO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) (b) (3)
10. 1100 - 1130	CO CHECK OUT	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) (b) (3)
11. 1230 - 1330	LEADERSHIP TRAINING	READY ROOM	CDR (b) (3) ALL CPOs
12. 1400 - 1415	XO CHECK OUT	XO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AM3 (b) (3)
13. 1415 - 1430	CO CHECK OUT	CO's OFFICE	CDR (b) (3) AM3 (b) (3)
14. 1500 - 1600	FEP PT	BASE GYM	ALL REQUIRED

QUESTIONS:

NATOPS: IN THE EVENT OF HYD 2 FAILURE WITH EMERGENCY BRAKES SELECTED, BACK-UP HYDRAULIC PRESSURE FOR EMERGENCY BRAKING IS PROVIDED BY THE BRAKE / APU / BRAKE AND APU (CIRCLE ONE) ACCUMULATOR(S).

SOP: WHO IS THE FINAL AUTHORITY IN DETERMINING WHEN LIVE ORDNANCE MAY BE CARRIED?

TACTICS: WHAT ARE THE FREQUENCIES FOR ALQ-218 LO, MID, AND HI RECEIVER BANDS?

OFFICERS ON LEAVE/TAD:

(b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3) (b) (3)

Submitted By:

Reviewed By:

Approved By:

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

(b) (3) (A)

Schedule Writer

Operations Officer

Commanding Officer

ELECTRONIC ATTACK SQUADRON ONE THREE ZERO (VAQ-130) Work Center Interviews

On 20 October, 2017, Captain (b) (3) (A) conducted informal group interviews with three VAQ-130 work centers: Power Plants (AD), Avionic Technicians (AT) and Material Control (LS). These work centers totaled approximately 24 Enlisted Sailors of paygrades ranging from E-3 to E-6 and represented a diverse cross section of the command's demographic base (Female, Hispanic, Asian American, African American, and Caucasian). Discussions focused on overall command morale, climate, fairness, respect, equality, and trust. The feedback was overwhelmingly positive. Specific examples cited by more than one Sailor included the Coffee with the Skipper, the Meritorious Advancement Program (MAP) process and a manning decision during a recent detachment. Regarding the detachment, a female E-5 was initially left off the detachment based on fiscal concerns (cost incurred due to separate billeting). She felt comfortable in addressing this decision and brought it up to the chain of command. After reviewing the issue, the Commanding Officer reversed the decision citing merit outweighing fiscal constraints. The only consistent concern addressed was the amount of BAH received in Whidbey Island which is not an entitlement controlled by the squadron.

Interview with LT (b) (3), VAQ-130, 1310


On October 20, 2017, Captain (b) (3) (A) conducted an informal interview with LT (b) (3), a Naval Aviator (1310) assigned to VAQ-130 for approximately two years. His follow on orders are to the Electronic Attack Weapon School (EAWS) at NAS Whidbey Island via the Growler Tactics Instructor (GTI) course. When questioned about the ready room climate he indicated that it was a tight knit group of officers that get along well. There are no cliques and no one is shunned or excluded. His description of the squadron's demeanor regarding the execution of flying duties was that while "exploring the limits of aircraft and aviator capability" was encouraged, the rules are understood and "not to be broken". He described a strong debrief culture where the aviators "hold each other accountable, provide constructive feedback while providing a way to be better." Finally, he expressed positive interaction between the ready room Officers and the Sailors in the command.

Enclosure (30)

VI. OVERALL UNIT SUMMARY


The figures below compare your organization's average for each climate factor against your Service's average. The box to the right of each figure containing your organization's average will be color-coded blue, red, or green. Blue indicates your organization's average falls within the Range of "Near Service Average" values shown below each figure. Unit averages below this range are color coded red, while averages above this range are color coded green. Service averages are recalculated on a fiscal year semi-annual basis.

Organizational Commitment




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.77 - 3.15

Trust in Leadership



Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.61 - 3.05

Organizational Performance




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.72 - 3.06

Organizational Cohesion




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.74 - 3.08

Leadership Cohesion



Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.57 - 2.98


Job Satisfaction



Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.72 - 3.11




Organizational Processes




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.68 - 3.03

Diversity Management




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.78 - 3.09

Help Seeking Behaviors




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.90 - 3.15

Exhaustion




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.42 - 2.89

Sexist Behaviors




Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.99 - 3.31

Sexual Harassment



Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.15 - 3.38

Sex Discrimination




Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.10 - 3.37

Blue = Near Service Average

Green = Above Service Average

Racist Behaviors

Your Unit




Your Service

3.22

Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.07 - 3.38

Disability Discrimination

Your Unit




Your Service

3.16

Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.01 - 3.31

Racial Discrimination

Your Unit




Your Service

3.26

Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.14 - 3.40

Age Discrimination

Your Unit




Your Service

3.13

Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.00 - 3.30

Religious Discrimination

Your Unit




Your Service

3.34

Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.26 - 3.44

Demeaning Behaviors

Your Unit




Your Service

3.10

Range of "Near Service" Average = 2.92 - 3.27

Hazing Behaviors

Your Unit



Your Service

3.44

Range of "Near Service" Average = 3.31 - 3.57

Blue - Near Service Average

Green - Individual Average

ADMIN#: 1700179

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Enclosure (31)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (3) (A) LCDR VAQ-130
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2017 5:15 PM
To: (b) (3) (A) CAPT VFA-106, Student
Subject: Flight Hour Execution

Sir,

My understanding and interpretation of flight hour execution policy and how I applied it to this quarter is as follows:

VAQ-130 was allocated 392 hours for the quarter which I utilize to maintain currency and readiness as well as maximize opportunities for GWTP production. My training officer and I work to provide a steady and consistent training plan relevant to upcoming detachments and to keep JOs progressing through their syllabus events.

With respect to hours execution, I understand that there is no harm or foul to giving hours back, and I have never been pressured to execute all of our allocated hours. That being said, I personally strive to provide as many training opportunities to my aircrew built around the available hours.

While I felt no pressure to execute all hours, I intentionally front loaded this quarter to be a good steward of our allocation. For FY18 quarter 1, I planned to lose my training assets to GTI support, so I scheduled more flight hours in October and November because flight opportunities while my aircraft were dedicated to GTI would be limited. I also targeted a completion prior to December 22nd in order to facilitate Holiday leave.

I expected GTI to fly about 40-60 hours on our aircraft. I expected my aircrew to fly within 90% of our allocation (about 360-370 of our 392). I plan to report a portion of the GTI support hours as special interest which will result in a total of all 392 hours being utilized by December 22nd.

V/R,

(b) (3)

LCDR (b) (3) (A) USN
Operations Officer
VAQ-130 ZAPPERS
(b) (3) (A) @navy.mil
(b) (3) (A)

Enclosure (32)

Subj: CDR (b) (3) (A) Interview Summary dtd 20 NOV 17

The following is an accurate summary of oral statements made by CDR (b) (3) (A), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE ZERO Commanding Officer, on 20 NOV 2017 that were not already addressed in his written statement.

When discussing LT (b) (3) (A)'s follow on orders to VT-9, CDR (b) (3) (A) stated that LT (b) (3) (A) is intellectually well-suited to instruct at the Electronic Attack Weapons School (EAWS), but LT (b) (3) (A) was not interested in that billet. CDR (b) (3) (A) commented that LT (b) (3) (A) "is not a meat-eater". Therefore, CDR (b) (3) (A) spoke with the community detailer to get LT (b) (3) (A) orders to VT-9. CDR (b) (3) (A) said, "I don't let my lieutenants talk to the detailer."

CDR (b) (3) (A) stated that VAQ-130 attempted to get ahead in their FY-18 QTR1 flight hour execution because the squadron would have reduced flying opportunities while supporting a Growler Tactics Instructor Course. The attitude of "burning hours" may have led to aircraft being airborne with no assigned mission or training.

When asked if he felt like the squadron had a cavalier attitude, CDR (b) (3) (A) stated that he approaches issue with the questions "is it unsafe?", "is it illegal?" and "it's a good idea?". CDR (b) (3) (A) said that he sees himself as the most aggressive CO on the flightline and encourages an aggressive attitude in the Ready Room.